At Jodhpur, the F-35 was on display. That distinction is becoming central to India’s search for a fifth-generation fighter. At Exercise Tarang Shakti, the United States sent F-35As and F-16s to fly alongside Indian aircraft including Rafales, Su-30MKIs and Tejas fighters. The appearance delivered a clear signal of American partnership and its ability to deploy a stealth fighter to India. But Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh made the limits equally clear. The United States had made no official proposal to sell the F-35 to India.
His widely reported remark that Indian personnel were not allowed close to the aircraft and were not shown its cockpit, was later described as light-hearted. Yet it captured a serious point. India can fly beside the F-35 without seeing its mission systems, stealth materials, software architecture, maintenance data or weapons-integration rules.
The Air Chief’s message was more direct than a conventional procurement statement. India wants fifth-generation capability. If Washington wants India as an F-35 customer, it must make a formal offer and answer the questions that come with it. The Indian Air Force chief does not decide procurement alone but his view carries exceptional weight in a country where the fighter gap is no longer abstract.
China already fields stealth fighters, led by the J-20, and is expanding its wider fifth-generation ecosystem. Pakistan’s prospective access to Chinese fifth-generation aircraft and related training adds urgency to the regional calculation. Even if timelines, configurations and operational readiness remain uncertain, India cannot plan its future force structure on the assumption that its adversaries will wait.
That is why Russia’s Su-57 proposal matters. Moscow has already offered the Su-57 to India and has indicated a willingness to discuss cooperation, manufacturing and potentially technology transfer. Air Chief Marshal Singh has said India has not yet decided whether to evaluate it. That is a more consequential position than it may appear. An evaluation would not mean India has chosen Russia. It would mean India is testing whether the aircraft can meet Indian requirements and whether the political, industrial and support package is credible.
India’s choice is not a fan contest between the F-35 and Su-57. It is a decision about time, capability and control.
The F-35 offers a mature multinational programme, a large production base, advanced sensor fusion, extensive weapons integration and a network of allied operators. It also comes with a tightly controlled American ecosystem. The United States protects the aircraft’s software, mission-data environment, stealth maintenance processes and sensitive systems. Any Indian purchase would raise difficult questions over access to source code, national weapons integration, data sovereignty, local repair rights, upgrade authority and the freedom to operate the aircraft in a crisis without political friction.
The Su-57 would offer a different proposition. Russia has a long operational relationship with India through the Su-30MKI and other systems. It may be more open to industrial collaboration and Indian customisation. But India would need to scrutinise the Su-57’s production scale, engine maturity, stealth performance, weapons ecosystem, sanctions exposure, supply-chain reliability and the effects of Russia’s war-driven industrial demands.
Neither aircraft is simply a fighter. Each is a long-term dependency structure. A fifth-generation fleet requires more than acquisition funds. It requires simulators, specialised maintenance, secure data infrastructure, mission planning systems, low-observable repair capability, weapons stocks, software upgrades, trained engineers and a supply chain that can operate for decades.
There is one further complication, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft programme. AMCA is not merely a future jet. It is India’s argument that the country should eventually control its own stealth design, mission systems, weapons choices and upgrade path. A large foreign fifth-generation purchase could provide an immediate capability bridge. It could also consume money, pilots, engineering attention and political urgency that AMCA needs.
The answer may be a mixed strategy. Acquire a limited number of foreign fifth-generation aircraft to close a near-term gap, while protecting AMCA as the long-term sovereign programme. But that approach works only if the foreign purchase transfers useful knowledge without making the domestic programme dependent on another country’s permissions.
Therefore, Tarang Shakti was therefore more than an air exercise. The F-35’s presence told China, Pakistan and India’s partners that the United States can bring its most advanced fighter into the region. The Rafales demonstrated the depth of France’s defence relationship with India. The Su-30MKIs showed the continuing scale of India’s Russian-origin fleet. Tejas represented the domestic future India wants to expand.
Each aircraft came with a flag. Each also came with factories, supply chains, software rules, weapons packages, export permissions and strategic expectations.
The Air Chief’s Jodhpur comment was not really about being kept out of a cockpit.
It was about whether India will be invited into the system behind the cockpit and whether any foreign fifth-generation aircraft can give India capability without taking away too much control.