One city is preparing to operate two airports. The risk is that a passenger arriving at one will discover that their connection, baggage and airline staff are waiting at the other.
Mumbai International Airport Ltd, or MIAL, wants to shift roughly a third of each airline’s international passenger and cargo traffic from Terminal 2 at Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport to Navi Mumbai International Airport. The proposal is tied to redevelopment of Mumbai’s ageing Terminal 1, where demolition of the north section of Terminal 1-B is planned from January 15th 2027.
The International Air Transport Association has asked the Civil Aviation Ministry to intervene. Its argument is not that Navi Mumbai should remain empty. IATA supports the long-term dual-airport system. Its objection is to a mandatory transfer without airline agreement, a clear timetable or proof that the whole operating ecosystem is ready.
That dispute is about more than slots. It is about whether Mumbai builds a second airport or splits a single network in two.
Under MIAL’s earlier plan, at least one-third of international aircraft movements from Mumbai Terminal 2 were to shift to Navi Mumbai from October 1st. At the same time, a third of Terminal 1 traffic would move to Terminal 2 from October 25th, releasing space for redevelopment. The immediate October 1 transfer has not materialised and airlines have since been told they may relocate, or temporarily suspend operations until the rebuilt Terminal 1 opens around 2029-30.
MIAL’s problem is real. Mumbai’s existing airport needs redevelopment, and it cannot be rebuilt while every existing flight remains in place. Navi Mumbai was conceived precisely to provide additional capacity for the Mumbai metropolitan region.
But capacity is not the same as connectivity. An airport can have runways, gates and immigration counters. It still needs handling agents, engineers, spare parts, catering, cargo equipment, crew hotels, transport, airline offices, regulatory approvals and a reliable way for passengers to reach the right aircraft.
IATA has listed those requirements in its complaint. It wants an agreed operational-readiness and airport-transfer process, transparent milestones and regulatory oversight before airlines are required to move.
Air France-KLM has stated the dilemma plainly. It will not split its Mumbai operation between Mumbai and Navi Mumbai. Running part of an airline from each airport would require separate ground teams, duplicated processes, new training and divided resources. The group says it could consider moving entirely if capacity at Mumbai declines, but that splitting operations is not viable.
That is a rational position. A long-haul carrier’s Mumbai flight is not simply a widebody arriving and departing. It is an operation with connecting passengers, baggage transfers, freight, maintenance support, catering, crew management and local sales arrangements. Divide the operation, and every one of those functions becomes more complex.
The passenger consequence is sharper. A traveller flying, for example, from Paris to Mumbai and then onward on another carrier could land at Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport only to find their domestic connection departing from Navi Mumbai. The two airports are separated by more than a terminal train ride. The road transfer via the Atal Setu may be quick in ideal conditions, but Mumbai traffic, security screening, baggage collection, immigration and re-check-in turn a nominal transfer into an uncertain journey.
A through-ticket can protect a passenger only if airlines and airports design an integrated system. That requires protected minimum connection times, guaranteed road transfers, clear baggage rules, shared disruption handling and responsibility when traffic or operational failures cause a missed flight. None should be assumed.
London shows the danger of confusing a city with a single airport. Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and London City serve the same metropolitan market but are not interchangeable transfer points. Airlines organise their networks around one airport where they can. Passengers who need to change airports normally do so at their own risk unless a carrier has created a specific arrangement.
Bangkok operates Suvarnabhumi and Don Mueang as distinct airports with broadly differentiated airline and traffic patterns. The system works better when carriers, rather than individual flights, are concentrated at one airport.
Istanbul’s transition was more decisive. Turkish Airlines and most scheduled traffic moved from Ataturk to the new Istanbul Airport, preserving the hub in one place. The change was disruptive, but it avoided creating a permanent cross-city transfer problem for connecting passengers.
Mumbai should take the same lesson. A dual-airport city needs a coherent allocation of airlines and traffic, not a spreadsheet exercise that puts one-third of every carrier’s flights across the harbour.
The immediate decision should not rest with MIAL alone. It owns and operates the constrained airport, but it does not bear every commercial consequence of moving an airline. The Civil Aviation Ministry, Airports Authority of India, DGCA, airport operators, airlines, ground handlers, immigration, customs and security agencies all have a stake.
A city can have two airports. It cannot expect passengers to treat them as one without building the bridge between them.