Boeing told 737 operators in August 2026 that a flight-management software condition can cut automated vertical guidance after one specific sequence. The crew flies a missed approach, or go-around, then changes the route loaded in the flight-management computer from the path first planned. Vertical navigation, VNAV, may then drop out. The aeroplane can stay on a simpler pitch mode such as level change or vertical speed. Boeing says crews already train to fly the aeroplane without VNAV. It is working on a software update. The FAA has opened a review and will convene a Corrective Action Review Board. It said it will act if that review finds a safety concern. No grounding has been ordered.
A go-around is a standard manoeuvre. The crew abandons a landing when the approach is unstable, the runway is occupied, or visibility fails the minima. It is not proof that the aircraft has failed. VNAV is the mode that follows a planned vertical path after take-off, on descent and on a published missed-approach procedure. If VNAV disengages in the case Boeing described, pilots still have the flight controls, other autopilot and flight-director modes, raw instrument data and the published missed-approach profile. Boeing has not described an automatic-landing failure. It has not said crews lose control of the aircraft.
Boeing has told operators to use existing procedures and as a precaution reported by Indian outlets citing sources, to reset the system after a missed approach. It is also writing a formal method to restore VNAV if the condition occurs on the next approach. That reset is an operating and training task. It can require a bulletin in the flight crew operations manual, a note in the electronic flight bag and, if the airline chooses, a simulator session. It does not, on the public record, take the MAX out of the schedule.
The software versions named in industry reporting are flight-management computer loads 14 and 14.1. Those loads are tied in US coverage to work on the MAX 7 and MAX 10. Southwest, United, American and Alaska have said their in-service MAX fleets do not use those loads. Some US airlines have refused new deliveries with the affected version. Boeing had spoken of a lasting software fix around 2028 and updated crew procedures around November. Reports now say it is trying to bring both dates forward. The FAA board will decide whether that work stays as manufacturer guidance or becomes a mandatory airworthiness action. MAX 10 certification sits in the same period of FAA attention. The agency has not, in the statements reviewed here, tied a halt of that certificate to this VNAV case.
India’s exposure is fleet size, not a confirmed count of affected loads. Recent reporting puts Air India Express at about 53 MAX aircraft and Akasa Air at about 43, about 96 together. But it is not established how many of those aircraft carry versions 14 or 14.1. Akasa Air said it is coordinating with Boeing and that the issue has not affected the safety of its operations. Air India Express has not published a software-version list. DGCA has not, in the material reviewed for this piece, issued a public bulletin or a special inspection order. Dispatch reliability will move only if crews add a reset on every go-around, if simulator time is pulled from the line, or if a later directive limits use of certain loads. That is an operations and engineering issue. It is not, on present evidence, a fleet stop.
The sequence to keep in view is short. Go-around. Route changed from the first plan. VNAV may drop to a simpler pitch mode. The crew flies the published procedure and applies Boeing’s reset. Until DGCA or the airlines publish which Indian tail numbers run the named software, treat 96 as the MAX inventory, not as 96 confirmed defective units.